This paper offers a positive theory of closed-end funds. It views them as an organizational innovation designed to serve clienteles of small investors with long holding periods and large transaction costs. Closed-end funds economize on transaction costs while investing safely in the most illiquid assets.
I. Introduction

I.1 The puzzle
A closed-end fund (CEF) is an asset management firm organized as a publicly traded corporation. A CEF holds a bundle of financial assets; both the firm's shares (the "bundle") and the assets that it owns trade contemporaneously in financial markets. But an individual investor can quit the fund only via selling his shares in the market; the fund's assets under management are locked in the fund "forever."
The puzzle is that the price of the "bundle" is often below the market value of its parts (that is, the fund trades at a "discount"). Two identical assets trading contemporaneously at different prices provide a classical recipe for a money machine and contradict the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. The fact that "bundling" assets into a closedend fund adds (or subtracts) value refutes the Miller-Modigliani analyses. And this situation persists for decades, involves billions of dollars, and grows in size. For example, by the end of 1999 U.S. closed-end funds had $165 billion in assets under management. Theorists are puzzled by persistence of discounts, and perplexed by the fact that investors continue to buy new CEFs. Pontiff (1996) concludes that "…pricing theories 2 2001 Year Mutual Fund Fact Book , p.103. 3 Investment Companies Yearbook 2001 Ibid, p.33 … had very little if any ability to explain discounts" and Lee et al. (1991) observe that "it seems necessary to introduce some type of irrational investor to be able to explain why anyone buys the fund shares at the start …"
Not surprisingly, the last 15 years have witnessed a number of attempts to solve the CEF pricing puzzle (see Dimson and Minio-Kozerski(1999) for an extensive literature review). Researchers have discussed CEF discounts from two (complementary) angles: 5 fund management issues and impediments to arbitrage.
Fund management issues.
Why is it that only CEFs, which are viewed as being not different from open-end funds (OEFs), exhibit the puzzling behavior, whereas OEFs are "well behaved"? For example, Lee et al. (1990, p.156) state: "Large closed-end funds… charge fees that are comparable to those of large no-load mutual funds. Since both are providing similar services, it would seem that both should sell at the same price." This line of literature tried to solve the discount puzzle via arguments of "tax overhang," "agency costs," etc. Malkiel (1977) showed that these arguments can explain the phenomenon only partially, at best.
Impediments to arbitrage. The "bundling" of assets in a CEF-type arrangement is viewed by this strain of literature as being a portfolio-type operation: the ownership of x% in the CEF (according to this literature) gives ownership of x% of the NAV. Yet Pontiff's (1997) influential article showed that any attempt to solve the puzzle within a classical rational-and-efficient-markets paradigm has to be built on different assumptions (than the above): if "…a share in a closed-end fund is [just ] a claim on the fund's assets, the volatility of a closed-end fund [share price] should equal the volatility of the underlying 5 See also Spiegel (1999) and Berk-Straton (2004) for models that explain CEF discounts from first principals.
portfolio "(p.155 ). Yet Pontiff shows that the volatility of a CEF's price is much higher than the volatility of its NAV; most of that excess volatility is idiosyncratic in nature and could be diversified away. Pontiff interpreted his findings as "…contradict[ing] the efficient markets model" (p.155).
The presence of excess volatility may point to the presence of an additional risk factor. Lee et al. (1991) suggest investor sentiment as this risk factor. Their theory is based on the following facts and assumptions: 1) trading in the shares of the CEFs is done predominantly by small investors; 2) small investors are inclined (being mainly noise traders) to bouts of optimism and pessimism (this is investor sentiment); and 3) investor sentiment cannot be diversified (due to a large mass of small traders) and has to be compensated via an additional risk premium. Therefore, the CEF has to trade at a discount.
But this theory leaves unexplained the prolonged presence of premiums among many CEFs. Premiums are rarely observed among the equity CEFs but they are commonplace among the municipal bond funds. In 1998, for example, a full quarter of the 171 municipal bond CEFs traded at a premium and the maximum premium was 9.7% (see Table II ). Similarly, during the period 1988-1994 most municipal bond CEFs traded (on average) at premium. Obviously, investor sentiment risk could not be the only factor that influences the behavior of CEF discounts.
The literature avoids analyzing whether closing the funds in a CEF has any efficiency justification. It is viewed as a rent-seeking arrangement that provides "tenure"
to the entrenched management team. The new CEF IPOs are explained by a marketing hypothesis: the presence of naïve investors motivates professionals to market new CEFs to a less-informed public (Hanley, Lee, and Seguin, 1996, p.130) . In other words, the CEFs' raison d'etre is rooted in market inefficiency.
I.2 A new framework of analyses of CEFs
Following Amihud and Mendelson (1986) To present my idea, I consider a simple situation with two types of individual investors by investable wealth (large and small) and two types of individual investors by holding period (long-term and short-term). By assumption, there is no correlation between wealth and holding period.
Let the investment universe be composed of two risky assets, X and Y, and a riskfree interest-bearing bank account. Assets X and Y have the same risk characteristics (for 6 Harris and Piwovar (2004) find that "effective spreads in municipal bonds average about 2% of price for retail size trades of $20,000 and about 1% of price for institutional size trades of $200,000 (p.1.)" example they have both beta of 0.9, or they are both California municipal bonds) but asset X is more liquid and, thus, Y yielding in equilibrium a higher return than X, A specialized fund could discriminate between long-and short-term investors by charging new investors a two-part fee: a one-time upfront fee (that is, a front load) and a periodical managerial fee. An upfront fee equal to the highest incremental gain of the short-term investor from investing in the specialized fund (vs. that investor's next-best investment option) would discourage short-term investors from investing in the fund. Only the "target" clientele group with longest holding period will consider investing in the fund.
Then the fund can specialize in the low-liquidity assets that are optimal for this clientele.
Long-term investors would benefit from investing in a specialized open-end mutual fund (due to low institutional trading costs of the fund), provided that costs of institutional services are smaller than savings on trading costs.
There is sufficient empirical evidence that this is the practice of existing funds. Edelen (1999) showed that a fund's failure to discriminate among investors (by its readiness to provide free liquidity) generates sizable losses for that fund's average investor. Chordia (1996) shows that mutual funds try to attract specific groups of investors by using load and redemption fees as instruments of costly signaling. An investor in a CEF gives up the option to "fire" the fund's managers: the CEF management team is "tenured" and its annual compensation (as a percentage of NAV) is guaranteed "forever." This empowers the current entrenched management with property rights over a portion of the fund's assets. 9 The property right allocation is crucial in understanding the presence and persistence of CEF discounts Our theory offers a raison d'etre for the CEFs as an organizational form. It explains rationally why the funds in a CEF are closed and why premiums/discounts are a rational and predictable phenomenon: 1) a closed-end fund is an organizational innovation designed to allow small investors with long holding periods to invest safely in the least liquid assets via a mutual-fund-type vehicle; 2) fund closing generates managerial tenure as a by-product: the CEF's management team gets the valuable "tenure "rights; and 3) a CEF's premium is equal to the capitalized value of "clientele service" minus the capitalized cost of managerial tenure. The resulting amount 10 can be positive or negative 11 .
8 The CEF-related literature habitually ignores this organizational difference between the CEF and the OEF. Gruber (1995) being the noticeable exception. 9 Our calculations below show that this portion can be as large as 20%. 10 The assumption that CEF provides clientele service explains premiums: they are clientele's valuation of the net value-added (above the cost of management. 11 Elsewhere[ see Cherkes (2002) ] I showed that empirical data supports a contention that this amount is always positive at the time of fund's IPO.
Our model predicts that CEFs (when compared to same-asset OEFs) should invest in lessliquid assets, and should generate higher gross rates of return. It also emphasizes that managerial costs play an important role in the pricing of CEF shares. In particular, we conjecture that the interplay of two forces (the value added by clientele service and the capitalized value of the costs of management) explains the cross-sectional behavior of discounts.
Below we report our empirical findings and present the literature's empirical findings that support our theory. In particular, we show that municipal bond CEFs, when compared to same-asset OEFs, hold lower-liquidity assets and generate higher returns.
We also show that CEF premiums are negatively correlated with the size of managerial compensation.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows: the formal model is presented in The closed-end fund is assumed to have an infinite life with a constant rate of perannum management fee. Assets of the fund grow at an annual rate of (
where r is the required rate of return on high-liquidity assets and ρ is the liquidity premium (above r ) on low-liquidity assets.
The fund pays out (as matter of policy or law) δ % of end-of-the-year NAV in annual dividends and management is annually paid k % of the end-of-the-year NAV. No other cash outflows occur.
The marginal investor in the fund applies to the fund's cash flows the discount rate (1 ) *(1 ) r τ + + , whereτ is the marginal investor's required liquidity premium. We assume that managers are large investors (by their personal wealth) and thus do not belong to the fund's clientele: they apply to their annual compensation (paid as k % of the end-of-the-year NAV) the discount rate of (1 ) *(1 ) r ρ + + .
II.2 Notation
The values below are measured as rates or in "dollar-per-share" terms. 
II.3 Assumptions:
1. The CEF is managed in perpetuity by an infinitely lived team;
2. δ =const.; ρ =const.; k=const.; r = const., τ =const.;
3. The CEF invests only in the less-liquid assets; the annual expected growth of the fund's assets is (
] are made at the end of the year; the fund
in assets under management at the beginning of the year (t+1).
5. The beginning of year 1 (today) will be denoted t=0.
6. The fund's marginal investor discounts his dividend flows at a rate (1 ) *(1 ) r τ + + ;
7. Managers of the fund discount the fund's cash flows at a rate (1 ) *(1 ) r ρ + + .
II.4 Results
Managerial claim on assets. Assume that fund's NAV is equal to (0)
as assets grow at ( ) * ( ) 1 1 + + r ρ annually and are depleted at rate (
annually.
The annual management fee at the end of year t is
and its present value at
The PV of all future fee payments is
i.e., entrenched management has a claim on ( )
Pricing of an existing CEF. At the end of each year, a dividend * ( ) X t δ is paid out:
The PV of this dividend to fund's marginal investor is
as the marginal investor's annual discount rate is (1 ) *(1 ) r τ + + .
Then the PV of all future dividends is
Thus, the fund's marginal investor values the fund as * (0) X β where
13
(
− , i.e., the marginal investor's valuation of the fund might be different from fund's NAV. Denote (0) P as the market price of a CEF stock at time t =0.
A rational investor will pay for that stock the PV of its future cash flows: 13 We shall assume that
; this condition is necessary for the value of the Fund's shares to be finite. between the fund's NAV and the share price, divided by the fund's NAV 14 :
Then by formula (8),
Formula (10) affords a straightforward interpretation of the CEF discounts: from
, the denominator of (0) d is positive; i.e.,
Inequality (11) tells that discount arises when the annual liquidity premium ρ is less than the management's annual compensation k plus the marginal investor's required liquidity premium τ . And that the fund trades at a premium when (
Bellow we will show that the interplay between ρ , τ , and k can explain the presence of discounts or premiums; that the interplay between δ and k will influence the size of the discount; and that relaxation of the assumption that const.
ρ =
helps to explain Pontiff's (1997) "excess volatility" findings.
III. Explaining past empirical findings
CEF discounts are deemed to be irrational. Yet they exhibit many puzzling regularities; it would appear as if there is a "method to the madness". In the next few pages I provide an 14 This definition implies that (0) 0 d > occurs when the CEF trades at a discount and (0) 0 d < occurs when the CEF trades at a premium. In the literature, discounts usually have negative values. The reader should be aware of this peculiarity in our definition.
explanation of these regularities 15 within the rational markets paradigm. I will do this by invoking the allocation of property rights within a CEF and by utilizing the features of the market-wide liquidity premium as described by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . I start with a short review of past empirical findings and then apply my model to explain them.
III.1 Review of past findings 1. Size of the discounts and their relationship to interest rates. Shares of the many CEFs
trade at sizable discounts, while some funds (contemporaneously) trade at premiums. The size of the discounts (often in double digits) escapes explanation (Lee et al., 1990) .
When a closed-end fund opens, the discount disappears. But when the fund is scheduled to open some time in the future, the discount disappears gradually (see Brauer, 1984) .
Empirical tests show a zero time-series correlation between discounts and interest rates Lee et al. (1991) ). This was interpreted by prior literature 16 as proof that management compensation is not important in explaining CEF discounts.
Time variation among discounts.
Discounts across different funds exhibit comovements ("cross-time" correlation) and mean-reverting behavior ).
The price of CEF shares (and by extension, the CEFs' discounts) exhibits a cross-time variation that differs from the variation of the underlying assets. Pontiff (1997) finds that their volatility was 60% higher than the volatility of the underlying assets. Discounts correlate with the returns of small firms, even when a fund holds no shares of small firms in its portfolio (Brauer and Chang (1989) ).
15 One of those puzzles (the "irrationality" of CEF's original investors) is discussed separately in Appendix. 16 "…changes in the discounts are not correlated with …changes in the term structure. This result is counter to the agency cost argument which predicts that when long rates fall the present value of future management fees rise, so discounts should increase" Lee et al. (1991, p.102) 3. Cross-sectional behavior of discounts. Discounts exhibit sizable cross-sectional variation, but researchers had difficulty identifying its determinants (see Barclay et al. (1993) ). Pontiff (1996) finds that funds with higher dividend payout ratios have lower discounts. Chay and Trzcinka (1999) provide evidence that the CEF premium can be a reliable predictor of the fund's NAV performance for the following two years: a 10% premium (discount) will be compensated for by next year's gain (loss) of 1.8%-2.4% in NAV performance. (2002) relationship between the two variables is assumed, when retail investors hold half of the shares, the discount is 5%; when retail investors reduce their holdings to one quarter of the shares, the discount rises to 25%" ( p.2,589).
Discounts and small investors. Gemmill and Thomas
III.2 Interpreting observed empirical regularities
Benchmark. The data 18 in Table I provide the 1990-2001 average values for the size of the discount, the expense ratio, and the payout ratio (sum of dividend payments and capital gains payouts) across equity CEFs, municipal bond CEFs, and taxable bond CEFs.
The equity CEFs' average values (k=1.57%; δ =6.75%; (0) 13.6%
d ≈ ) will serve as our benchmark. We further assume ρ τ = , i.e., the benchmark case has no clientele service effects. 
For equity CEFs, the average value of parameters formula (12) predicts a discount of 18%, which compares well with the average equity fund discount of 13.6%. (The value of 13.6% will be attained if we assume the value clientele service (i.e., ρ τ − ) to be 45 b.p.
per annum.
)
Formula (12) does not include r as a parameter 23 ; therefore, the zero correlation between r and d is predictable and the past interpretation of zero correlation between and r d (see footnote 16 in this paper) were rooted in a logical error. Brauer's (1984) finding that discounts disappear gradually in funds that are scheduled to open fits well with our conjecture that a CEF's management owns a part of 20 In Table I premiums are quoted in the usual way, i.e., negative value means that the fund trades below its NAV. 21 The approximate equality is attained by disregarding values * and * k ρ ρ δ in formula (7). 22 The average discount of municipal bonds CEFs , requires 85 b.p.
ρ τ − ≈ and to the average premium of the taxable bonds CEFs requires 1.3% ρ τ − ≈ . 23 The reason for this result is straight forward: the discount is a ratio; both the numerator and the denominator depend upon r , but the ratio does not depend upon it. the fund's NAV: a scheduled opening of a CEF changes the allocation of property rights, and managerial "tenure" becomes limited to the period from the announcement to the opening. The gradual disappearance of the discount is the "time decay" of managerial tenure.
Mean-reversion of discounts and their excess volatility. Formula (12) (2003) show that all asset prices are influenced by and respond to these market-wide liquidity conditions. They build a measure for market-wide liquidity, which exhibits mean-reverting behavior (see Figure I in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) ). They also show that small-stock returns exhibit strong correlation with the measure of market-wide liquidity. Changes in market-wide liquidity could generate both time comovement among the discounts and their mean reversion.
24 It can also explain the Brauer and Chang (1989) finding that CEF discounts are correlated with the returns of small firms, even when a fund holds no shares of small firms in its portfolio.
By definition of the discount, the relationship between the price of a CEF share, (0) P , and its per-share NAV, (0) X , is (0) (1 ) * (0)
.The variance of d is driven mainly by the variance in the market-wide liquidity whereas the variance in NAV is driven mainly by variance in interest rates (for municipal bonds' funds) or broad movements in the stock market (for equity CEFs). Therefore, it is natural to find that the variance of the CEF's price, (0) P , is much larger that the variance of its holdings, (0)
X
. In a somewhat different setting, 25 we have shown that the variance of a CEF's share is larger than the variance of the fund's NAV by 60% (as Pontiff (1997) finds it) under conservative calibration of the mean and variance of ρ .
Currently our above conjectures are speculative at best. Detailed empirical research is needed to support them. But they bring parsimony in explaining the hitherto dispersed observations.
Determinants of the cross-sectional variation in discounts.
Formula (12) explains the discounts' cross-sectional variation via cross-sectional variation in , and k δ ρ . Further, the variance of discounts should be at least as large as the sum of variances of these variables. We have no data about the liquidity premiums ( ρ ) of different funds, but the cross-sectional variation in the values of and k δ is documented and is sizable (see Table   II ). As expected, the cross-sectional variation among the discounts is larger than the cross-sectional variation among expense ratios and among payout ratios: the absolute level of the standard-deviation-to-mean ratio is 2.29 for discounts, but only 0.3 for expense ratios and is close to zero for dividends. Cherkes (1999, pp.13-14) where parameter ρ was allowed to be random. 26 In Table II discounts are quoted in the usual way, i.e., negative value means that the fund trades below its NAV. The data is given for 171 funds only as some 40 funds miss some of the data in 1998. The predictions of formula (12) are supported by Pontiff's (1996) findings that an increase in the dividend ratio decreases the CEF's discount.
We further speculate that the Chay and Trzcinka (1999) findings (that a 10% premium will be compensated for by next year's gain of 1.8%-2.4% in NAV performance) are caused by differences in holdings of illiquid assets. Consider two funds, A and B. Assume that fund A holds assets of lower liquidity that fund B, and has 1.5% higher per-annum returns due to a higher liquidity premium. Using the data of municipal bonds (see Table I ), a difference of
is sufficient to attain a 10% premium (when compared to fund B) on fund A's shares. An increase in ρ by 1.5%
would simultaneously increase the annual return (by 1.5%) and increase the premium by a larger number.
Value of clientele service. Our model assumes that the trading costs of small investors are larger than those of the large investors; thus the value of clientele service is larger to small investors than to the large ones. As the level of the premium depends on the value of clientele service, an increase in the number of small investors should manifest itself in a higher premium as Gemmill and Thomas (2002) find.
IV. Property rights allocation within a CEF and the alignment of management incentives
efficient risk-reward portfolio. In an ideal world, fund managers align themselves with the interests of their investors. In the real world, the situation is more complex.
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Yet we conjecture that a CEF managers/investors interests are aligned better within a CEF (when compared to OEFs) due to CEF's unique property rights allocation.
First, we will demonstrate the mechanism that induces managers to invest aggressively in less-liquid assets. Second, we demonstrate the mechanism of managers/investors risk-reward alignment. Lastly, we explain why the majority stockholders of a fund that trades at a discount might find it uneconomical to open their fund. We close the section with discussion of the strand of literature that explains discounts via managerial waste (that is, agency costs).
Search for low-liquidity assets.
Practitioner literature is replete with descriptions of managerial dread of discounts, 28 with the bylaws of many funds requiring a shareholder vote on fund opening when the discount crosses a certain threshold. Our theory predicts that discounts appear when the capitalized value of clientele service is smaller than the capitalized value of the costs of management. The value of clientele service can be increased by changing the composition of a fund's portfolio toward less-liquid assets. We use formula (12) to show that this shift is not large: for example, the average 1990-2000 27 Risk of "incentive misalignment" is not trivial [see Brown et al (1996) , and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ]. It is especially important for new funds, small funds, and funds that have "a shot" on the top ranking for the current year. These funds may experience a substantial increase in the variance of their assets (without a parallel increase in expected returns) toward the end of the year. The CEF investors do not face such risk. 28 "Many fund managers take great pains to prevent their funds' shares from trading at deep discounts or nose-diving at the first sign of bad news. Some funds have even come to market promising annual tender offers at NAV. Better alignment of management incentives. Formula (3) shows that a CEF's management "owns" k k δ + % of fund's assets. The managerial stake in fund assets for the average equity CEF is 18.3% (see Table I ). Assuming a $250MM fund, the managerial stake is about $45MM. Now assume that the fund managers' risk aversion (with respect to their own wealth) is identical to the risk aversion of the CEF investors, and the $45MM constitutes the bulk of the fund managers' wealth. The closed-end fund managers are "co-opted" into a single major investor in the fund with an almost 20% (in our example) stake in NAV. The size of their stake and the absence of the threat of a massive fund withdrawal guarantee that managers of the fund will choose an investment profile consistent with their investors' risk-reward preferences. Actually, CEF managers may be too conservative 30 : after all, the value of their tenure is very large. Table III shows that CEFs have a smaller turnover ratio: 38% for OEFs vs. 28% for CEFs, and the difference is highly significant. Part of this difference is the by-product of the "withdrawal" option given to the OEF investors. But our preliminary calculations show that actual withdrawals can explain, at most, half of the 10% gap. The rest may be the OEF "management misalignment cost."
Risk of churning.
29 For the average value of muni bond CEFs' parameters. 30 Gruber (1996, Lee et al. (1990) ). This puzzlement is premised on an assumption that opening the fund would serve the interests of its investors. We apply our framework to show that the actual situation is more complicated.
In particular, one should consider the economic interests of a CEF's small investors that value the fund's clientele service.
First, we analyze the best way to change the status of a discounted CEF. We distinguish between converting a CEF into an OEF, and orderly liquidation via a distribution of net proceeds pro rata among the shareholders. A failing fund should be liquidated rather than opened. Converting a CEF into an OEF will change a fund's nature as the converted OEF has to shift its holdings away from less-liquid assets, thus defeating the "clientele service" that the fund was originally conceived for, and should be ready for the exit of some investors that were interested in less-liquid assets. The exit (and resulting sale of assets) will impose additional costs on the fund's investors; the latter will be distributed unevenly among the earlier and later "departees." We conclude that opening a CEF is never a good idea for its clientele.
Orderly liquidation of a failing fund may be a good idea if the average fund trades at a price that makes reinvestment of the liquidated fund's net proceeds economical to a client of the old fund. This will happen when the average fund 31 trades at discount. The average fund trading at discount indicates a decreased demand for the clientele service in that asset class; and decreased demand has to be accommodated via exit of some funds, 31 We use here "average fund" as shorthand for the fund with an average premium/discount among all CEFs in a particular asset class shrinking of the asset base of all funds, or a combination of the two options. This is done by a management that responds to discounts by "…promising annual tender offers at NAV. Other funds buy back their shares in the open market when their prices dip. Still other funds have steady payout policies that distribute anywhere from 7% to 12% of total returns per year." 32 When there are too many funds, liquidation of a failing CEF (rather than reorganization of it) might be the only option.
Orderly liquidation of a failing fund when the average fund trades at premium may not serve the interests of clients interested in its services; these clients will have to buy another CEF that currently trades at higher price than their original fund. And they will have to bear the "cost of liquidation." The average fund trading at a premium indicates that there is room for our fund, but under better management: new managers, lower managerial compensation, increase payout, etc. should be considered first.
Liquidation of a CEF should be considered as the last option.
We conclude that an outside "raider" will not find many allies among current stockholders when the majority of investors are still interested in the fund's clientele service. Table I , p.269) whereas bond funds had a mean discount of only 0.7%.
The economics of a partial owner 34 causing a 15% discount to a fund of hundreds of million of dollars just to employ himself or his relatives is problematic. Here is another possible explanation: in the Barclay et al. sample, equity funds (81 in number) trade at an average discount of 19.1%. A full 50% of equity funds and less than 3% of bond funds have blockholders. Could it be that the high correlation between the equity-fund discounts and blockholding (found by Barclay et al.) is an artifact of high correlation between blockholding and the equity fund dummy? Coles et al. (2000) show that "increasing the effective marginal compensation rate of the investment advisor by one standard deviation will increase the premium by about one percent" (p.1411). These findings indicate that managerial effort and talent may influence the size of the premium. But the influence is obviously quite small if a full one standard deviation can change the discount by just 1%, a small amount when the absolute levels of the discounts are considered.
To justify the tenured management as the main "discount-causing culprit" one has to provide the mechanism of managerial abuse. After all, we have an industry that manages a $100 billion plus portfolio: a 1% per-annum waste is a $1 billion per-annum 33 The mechanism of "managerial wastefulness" is only implied. But the authors did not prove any damage to the investors. It may be that these types of "fringe benefits" are just an "everyday practice" in all fund management firms in general, OEFs as well as CEFs. 34 Blockholders owned (among themselves) almost a one-fifth of equity funds.
gain/loss. Yet CEF managements generate higher gross average returns, charge expenses comparable to OEFs (see Table III ), and do not charge any load 35 payments or 12b-1 fees. We hold, therefore, that the "agency cost" explanation does not show much explanatory power when it comes to the presence of large discounts.
V. Empirical verification
Our model predicts that CEFs should hold lower-liquidity assets (when compared to same-asset-class OEFs) and generate higher gross returns. We test this prediction on the universe of all U.S. municipal bond mutual funds. We then test the prediction that the cross-sectional variation among CEF discounts is explained by values of the fund management fee (parameter k ), the fund dividend payout ratio (parameter δ ), the liquidity premium required by fund's marginal investor (parameter τ ), and the liquidity characteristics of the fund's holdings (parameter ρ ). We report results of all tests below.
V.1 Holdings and returns in municipal bond OEFs and CEFs
Our theory predicts that CEFs should hold lower-liquidity assets and, accordingly, generate higher average returns than same-asset OEFs. Chordia (1996) compares holdings of equity OEFs vs. equity CEFs and finds that the latter hold much smaller (i.e., less liquid) stocks. We test this prediction on the universe of all CEF and OEF municipal bond funds. Bonds provide a natural laboratory for this exercise as they have a number of "liquidity markers": higher coupons (for same maturities and comparable credit ratings 36 )
in bonds indicate the presence of a liquidity premium; longer maturities are (on average) 35 The latter, charged by OEFs may average approximately another full 1% per annum of the assetsunder-management. This calculations uses average values of Front-loads and Back-loads and divides them by 5, thus assuming a 5Y (average) holding period; the latter is consistent with the 20% annual average redemption rate. 36 We control for credit quality of both portfolios, as lower credit quality of the CEF portfolios could (by itself) cause higher returns and higher coupons. Table III reports the comparison of average holdings in the CEF and OEF portfolios on 1/1/2000; and the average five-year and ten-year returns for these portfolios.
Holdings are compared on average coupons, credit quality, and maturity. We provide the two-sided t-values for differences in averages as well. The results 38 support our predictions.
Returns. Gross returns 39 of CEFs are higher by 28 b.p. per annum for a ten-year horizon and 1.54% per annum for a five-year horizon. The differences are highly statistically significant and economically highly important.
10Y retCEFs
Survivorship bias may be at work here: there were 405 OEFs at the end of 1989 and only 355 by end of 1999; there were 38 CEFs at the end of 1989 and 36 by end of 1999. But correction of this bias should only strengthen our result.
Credit quality. The credit quality of CEF portfolios is higher than those of OEFs. For example, CEFs carry full 13.5% more AAA-rated bonds than do OEFs (54% vs.67.5%) and the difference is statistically significant.
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The data comes from Morningstar Principia Pro, the Jan. 2000 CEF and OEF CDs. This is the largest sample of CEFs utilized in any empirical work; to compare, Chordia has only 13 equity CEFs in his sample 38 To assure that our results are not driven by "marginal Funds", we repeated the same analyses for Funds with assets of 20MM and greater. The results (not reported here) did not change. 39 Gross returns on NAV are calculated by adding the 1999 expense ratio and (for OEFs) the 12b-1 fees to reported net returns.
CEFs vs. 14.78 years for OEFs. This difference is statistically highly significant.
Coupons. The average weighted coupon of the average CEF portfolio was 35 b.p. higher than that of the average OEF portfolio (the difference is statistically highly significant).
V.2 Explaining the cross-sectional variation among CEF discount
Our model explains the cross-sectional variation among CEF discounts through the values of the management fee ( k ), the payout ratio (δ ), the liquidity premium required by the fund's marginal investor (τ ), and the liquidity characteristics of the fund's holdings ( ρ ). Below we test a number of hypotheses with respect to these parameters.
From formula (10) we get (by disregarding values * and * k ρ ρ δ ):
That is, discounts 40 are monotone increasing in managerial compensation k and the marginal investor's liquidity premiumτ ; and monotone decreasing in the payout ratio δ and in the portfolio's liquidity premium ρ . The influence of k and ρ depends crucially on δ as the mixed second derivatives are negative.
The municipal bonds' data provide at least three measures of fund cash flows (parameter δ ): the 12-month yield, the income ratio, and the average-weighted coupon of the portfolio. 41 The first two measures use the market price of CEF shares as their 40 Remember that formula(13) gives discounts, not premiums.
41 12month Yield: 12 months income plus any capital gains distributed over the same period, and dividing the sum by its last month's ending market price; income refers only to interest payments from fixed-income securities and dividend payoffs from common stocks. Monies generated from the sale of securities or from options and futures transactions are considered capital gains, not yield. Average weighted Coupon is calculated by weighting each bond's denominators, i.e., they depend on the premium/discount of the fund. They also include (in one way or another) the fund's realized capital gains; the latter varies with market interest rates. Only the average-weighted coupon of the portfolio is not influenced by the market value of CEF shares or by the CEF's realized capital gains. As we need a measure that is "insulated" from market movements (remember that our model defines δ as the "constant periodical payment"), we utilize the average-weighted coupon of the portfolio as a measure of δ .
Data for the discount ( The liquidity premium ρ of a fund's portfolio is a priced variable that depends on the characteristics of the individual portfolio and on market-wide liquidity conditions. In a recent article, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) build a measure for market-wide liquidity for equity markets and calculate a monthly series of liquidity levels in equity markets for the years 1960-1999. We therefore conjecture that the individual portfolio's ρ is changing with changes in the Pastor-Stambaugh market liquidity measure. 43 We shall therefore run two separate regressions. rate of interest by its relative size in the portfolio. Income Ratio reveals the percentage of current income earned per share. It is calculated by dividing the fund's net investment income by its average NAV. 42 "Liquidity is a broad and elusive concept that generally denotes the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, and without moving the price." (Pastor and Stambaugh, p.2) . 43 The time serious was provided to me by Lubos Pastor. 44 In each case the size of the sample is defined by the data available from Principia CDs and the available P-S liquidity level series (that ends in 1999) In Regression I we theorize that the ρ τ − difference is influenced mainly by industrywide factors and we therefore use dummy variables for the years, while utilizing the endof-year 1996-2001data. in Regression II , it also has the sign consistent with our theory and is highly significant.
VI. Conclusions
The size of the CEF phenomenon, the inaction of the SEC, and the apparent indifference of investors 46 toward attempts to "open" even deeply discounted CEFs indicate that there is an economic rationale for the existence of the "closed-end fund" as a separate organizational form of fund management. In the Williamsonian tradition of attempting to understand and to explain an existing organizational form as an efficiencydriven design, we suggest here a testable positive theory to explain the CEF phenomenon. 45 Expense ratio is insignificant and positive in the constant -fund -effects regression of Regression II. 46 Opening of existing CEFs is a difficult task as investors and regulators do not show much enthusiasm : Barclay et al.( 1993) describe the many difficulties that are common in opening a CEF; Lee et al.(1990) report that" if the anti-takeover provisions do not work, the managers (of an CEF) can count on the help of the SEC, which…has frequently contributed to raising bidders' costs." (1990 p.160) . They also report that stockholders are not responsive to tender offers by outside raiders.
• The CEF is an institutional solution that provides the small investors 47 with access to the lowest-liquidity assets.
• The assets are "closed" to eliminate the risk of a "fund run" since a massive withdrawal would impose high costs on remaining investors. Managerial tenure is a by-product of "fund closing." Paradoxically, managerial tenure provides incentives to better serving the clientele and assures a better alignment of managementinvestor interests.
• The market valuation of a fund's shares "subtracts" the capitalized value of managerial tenure from a fund's NAV and adds the capitalized value of the "clientele service" to the NAV. The resulting sum can be higher or lower than the actual NAV.
To support our idea, we report comparative statistics for the U.S. municipal bond CEFs and OEFs and find that gross return of CEF portfolios consistently outperform their OEF counterparts; that CEF managerial fees are same as the OEFs, yet CEFs charge no load fees, 12-b-1 fees, etc. 48 ; and that CEFs hold less-liquid asset than their OEF counterparts.
We further explain the cross-sectional variation of discounts through variation in the funds' parameters and show that discounts may appear for certain values of these parameters. We thus explain CEF discounts within the classical rational-and-efficientmarkets paradigm.
47 "There is ample evidence that closed-end funds are owned and traded primarily by individual investors. …Using intraday trading data, we have found …that 64% of the trades in CEFs were smaller than $10,000." Lee et al (1991, p.82) 48 These fees add 1% per annum in costs to investors (assuming a 5Years' holding period for investment in OEFs). the fund's management, the differences in premiums among same-asset CEFs should be explained via differences in the quality of management. CEFs provide a unique opportunity to estimate the market valuation of managerial quality as every managerial choice is "priced into" the levels of premiums.
Clientele services. CEF managements provide (in addition to access to low-liquidity assets) a number of other services 49 : they borrow (municipal bond CEFs borrow at shortterm municipal rates, which can be lower than Treasury rates), and they select investment portfolios that are a combination of liquidity, credit, and duration features. All these services are priced into the premium/discount of a fund; the CEF data can be used as a natural laboratory for evaluating a vast array of issues from value added by different decisions of bond portfolio management to investors' attitude towards risk.
Other sources of clientele service. This paper is focused on one particular clientele service, namely, provision of access to less-liquid assets. Other sources of clientele service are possible: access to indivisible assets (as in the case of REITs), tax and regulatory arbitrage executed by professionals, access to foreign markets, lower borrowing costs, etc. These services deserve a separate discussion and empirical investigation.
Need for future research. The capitalized value of clientele services in general (and ours in particular) is a complex and rarely discussed phenomenon. Our empirical work is hampered by the absence of measurable liquidity characteristics for an individual portfolio and its interaction with market-wide liquidity (a liquidity beta). We have 49 The value of these services is included in the valuation of a CEF and will be important variable in explaining the cross-sectional variation among CEFs' premiums/discounts. We are thankful to professor Malkiel for this and many other insightful suggestions.
utilized crude measures of portfolio liquidity (like bonds' coupons and bonds' maturity) which exhibit the ability to explain some of the discount phenomena. But better measures of liquidity could be helpful and are a very promising area for future research. Front loads 1809 1.47% 190 n/a n/a n/a Back Loads 1809 1.13% 190 n/a n/a n/a Annual 12b-1 Fees 1809 0.39% 190 n/a n/a n/a
We start with establishing a framework for analyses. Assume a small investor is interested in adding to her investment portfolio $100 NAV of lowest-liquidity California municipal bonds.
As showed above, this makes her a client of CEFs specializing in California municipal bonds.
Let there be only two such CEFs, fund A and fund B. Fund A is a newly IPOed fund (offered at IPO premiumπ ), whereas fund B is a seasoned fund that trades at discount d .
We assume that there are no differences in the quality of A's and B's fund management; and The IPO costs (represented byπ ) are within the 4%-6 % range and discount brokerage costs in our sample period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) were below 4%, i.e., rational investors invest in CEF IPOs only when existing funds trade at a premium 53 . We tested this result for a number of homogeneous narrow asset classes and found that this requirement of rationality is observed in the Markets: new funds are brought to the market only when seasoned same-asset CEFs trade at a premium. Graph I exhibits the pattern for (1) gives d= -3% (i.e., 3% premium). Cherkes (2002) 54 .] Investors are indifferent between paying the inflated IPO price and buying seasoned same-asset CEFs at a premium plus brokerage.
This observation provides an economic rational for the timing of new entries: they occur when seasoned same-asset CEFs trade at premium, i.e., when the demand for intermediation services in a particular asset class is larger than the available amount of services. New entry increases supply of intermediation services. As any search process, it may provide "too much "of the new supply, thus causing the average premium of sameasset CEFs to decrease or even to become negative. But a rational investor cannot avoid the IPO cost if she is interested in acquiring that asset class. 
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